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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
:

Case No. 20060972-CA

PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
v.
SUSAN TRIPP,

(not incarcerated)

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT.

JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal
from a third degree felony conviction entered in a court of record.

ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION
1. Did the trial court err in denying the motion to suppress?
Motions to suppress are reviewed for clear error with regard to factual findings, and
for correctness with regard to legal conclusions. See, e.g.. State v. Jarman, 1999 UT App
269,1f 7, 987 P.2d 1284. In challenging a trial court's factual findings on a motion to
suppress, Tripp bears the burden to marshal the evidence which supports those findings.
See, e.g.. In re Estate of Beeslev. 883 P.2d 1343, 1347, 1349 (Utah 1994). When Tripp
asserts that certain findings are not supported by any evidence, this casts upon the State the

burden to show one scintilla of evidence in support of such findings. See, e^g,, Orlob v.
Wasatch Medical Management. 2005 UT App 430, ^ 20, 124 P.3d 269.
The issue was preserved by the motion to suppress (R. 36-58; 65-125; 126-44).
2. Did the trial court err in instructing the jury?
Jury instructions are reviewed for correctness. See, e.g.. Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d
425, 429 (Utah 1998).
This issue was preserved by objections in the trial court (R. 526: 391; R. 527:683-86).

CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Controlling constitutional provisions and statutes are in the addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
The State charged Tripp with automobile homicide, a third degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(1), and with failure to yield the right of way, a class C
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-72.10(3) (R. 2-3). Tripp was initially
represented by Barton Warren (R. 8). Magistrate Terry Christiansen presided over the
preliminary hearing and ordered Tripp bound over as charged (R. 32-33).
Tripp moved to suppress evidence, the Government opposed the motion, and Tripp
replied (R. 36-58; 65-125; 126-44). Judge Kennedy presided over an evidentiary hearing and
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heard oral argument before denying the motion to suppress (R. 157-62). Present counsel
entered an appearance after the motion to suppress was adjudicated and prior to trial (R.
147).
Following the trial, the jury convicted Tripp as charged (R. 299). Judge Kennedy
sentenced Tripp to concurrent terms of zero to five years in prison and ninety days in jail, but
then suspended that sentence and required her to serve three hundred and sixty days in jail
as a condition of probation (R. 397-400, 403). Tripp filed a timely appeal (R. 409).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Tripp stopped at the stop sign on the Old Bingham Highway and was driving her
truck across U-l 11 at the intersection, when Daniel Pracht's motorcycle, which was
headed south on U-l 11, slid underneath and into the rear end of her truck (R. 525: 346).
Pracht later died from his injuries sustained in the crash (R. 533: 9).
The police were called immediately to the scene, at 6:53 p.m. (R. 526: 449). The
police did not ask Tripp to perform field sobriety tests (R. 533: 25). One of the officers
who was trained to detect signs of impairment testified at trial that he had no reasonable
suspicion that Tripp was impaired, but sought a blood draw from her as a matter of
course, as he does in all serious accidents (R. 525: 350, 377).
Tripp consented to undergo a urine test, but adamantly refused to submit to a blood
test because she is phobic of needles (R. 533: 65). The police isolated her from her
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friends and family, informed her she was in custody, and demanded that she submit to the
blood test, telling her that they would get a warrant and take her blood by force if she did
not submit (R. 532: 23-27, R. 533: 28, 35, 71-72). The victim's advocate tried
unsuccessfully to calm Tripp and assuage her fear of needles, and the blood tech also told
to calm her and paraphrased the DUI admonitions, mentioning her rights to silence, to
counsel, and her right to refuse the test (R. 525: 268, R. 533: 102). During the blood
draw, Tripp was in a police car, with a police officer outside the car door and covering
Tripp's eyes, a victim's advocate kneeling in front of her holding one of her hands, and
the blood tech right outside the car door holding her other arm behind her (R. 533: 67, R.
525: 270). While she did extend her arm to the blood tech prior to the test, this was in
response to his telling her that he was going to put the tourniquet on and see if there was a
spot where it would be easy to draw blood (R. 533: 95). The blood tech felt at that time
that Tripp did not know that he had his other equipment ready to draw her blood when she
extended her arm (R. 533: 95). He testified that once he found a spot to draw the blood,
he told her he had found an easy site and told her "we can just go ahead and take care of
this," and as the victim advocate continued reassuring Tripp, he stuck the needle in (R.
533: 95). During the blood draw, Tripp was described as terrified, petrified, crying, and
panicked (R. 533: 67, 71, 95). She was pulling away and crying as they secured her (R.
533: 67, R. 525:271).
Tripp's blood, which was drawn at 9:25 (R. 525: 257), showed metabolite of
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cocaine and blood alcohol levels of .085 and .089 (R. 525: 305, 309, 319). There was no
scientific means to assess when Tripp took the cocaine or whether the cocaine metabolite
had any impairing effect on Tripp (R. 525: 306, 309). The equipment used to assess
blood alcohol levels is only within six percent of accuracy ninety-six percent of the time
(R. 525: 324).
At the time of the collision, Pracht may have been speeding, and this may have
been the cause of the accident. As the trial court recognized, the State's evidence
conflicted regarding whether he should have been driving fifty or sixty miles an hour (T.
526: 563, 696, R; 527: 705, State's Exhibit 30). Tripp had the right to assume that Pracht
was going the speed limit (R. 533: 60-61). The State's accident reconstructionist
conceded that, due to a lack of underlying data from the police investigation, he would
not purchase stock if his decision were based on information of the same quality as he had
to work with in Tripp's case (R. 526: 516). Nonetheless, he estimated that Pracht was
driving at least 59 miles an hour, and may have been going faster than that (R. 526: 505,
514). He testified that if Pracht had been going fifty miles an hour, Tripp would have
cleared the intersection before Pracht came through, and that there would have been no
accident (R. 526: 516).
Pracht's braking error may have caused the accident. The point of impact between
his motorcycle and the rear end of Tripp's truck appeared to be within three feet of either
side of the center line on U-l 11, the road Pracht was driving on at the time of the crash
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(R. 526: 509). iiic physical evidence showed that prioi to the collision, Pracht was- •
applying only his rear brake (R. 526: 475), and that he skidded for some forty-four feet

Appivirm onh me rear brake on a m o u w w l e routinely causes them to lose control and
slide (R. 526: 410, 415). Had Pracht been braking properly, he could have stopped or
steered around' I i ipp's truck, i ather than sliding uiuiciinjath ai.J colliding u nh it as he did
(K Si2 "W-W)

'

- •

Pracht's motorcycle headlight was on at the time of the crash (R. 525: 348, 374),,
but the road Pracht was driving on is hilly, and dips three eights of a mile nrio* n- ?b
intersectioi

. .,

i :^ ;W.K; ^w..iguratj-. ,

blo*'k<*.

-

!

i npp\ own doorpost voaid nave
IS(V(|i

Pracht's only fatal injury was to his head (R. 525: 238-49). While his helmet was
found somewhere near the scene of the crash (R. 525: 344), there was no evidence that
I "i achtw as "wearing it at the time of the crash (R 526: 1 1 6 51)
In response to the defense motic n tc • si lppi ess tl I = bio :)(i test the ti ial • : : i it: I:
admitted the test result on the theory that Tripp's blood draw was voluntary and
consensual (R 157-60).

as a superseding cause (R. 336).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court's ruling denying the motion to suppress on the theory that Tripp
consented to the blood draw is factually clearly erroneous and legally incorrect. Tripp's
blood test was not taken with her voluntary consent, but was instead taken when she was
illegally arrested and physically restrained, and after the police had threatened to obtain a
warrant and take her blood by force. These facts fail to establish consent as a matter of
law, and compel suppression.
The trial court's jury instructions erroneously forbade the jurors to consider
whether Pracht's own conduct was the superseding cause of the fatal accident. This error
diminished the State's burden of proof of the element of causation and undercut Tripp's
presumption of innocence and constitutional rights to present her defense.
Because of the prejudicial nature of the errors, the Court should reverse Tripp's
convictions.

ARGUMENTS
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON THE MOTION TO
SUPPRESS WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND LEGALLY
INCORRECT.

A,

THE FINDINGS OF FACT WERE CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND MATERIALLY INCOMPLETE.

The trial court's findings on the motion to suppress now follow, with emphasis
added to those findings that are challenged on appeal. The challenges follow the
7

quotation of the court's findings.
FINDINGS OF FAC I '
: rd in an auto motorcycle accident , v hich i esi ilted in

1.' rhe ueieiiuuiii
the death of Damn l*iaUii
2. The defendant was asked to subi i i. a chemical test and stated that
officers could test her blood if the) did not use a needle.
3. The defendant's initial refusal to take a blood test was based solely on
her fear of needles.
4 Wlien speaking with Officer Saunders, the defendant denied using
alcohol or drugs and expressed her fear of needles.
5. Detective Roberts talked with the defendant multiple nines, * nc mwi ^ no
spoke with the victim, the more concerned he hi'«\*mi.» tk*u shr w ^ inm.n'ivd
by something.
6. Detective Roberts based his assessment on the fact that the redness of the
defendant's eyes did not dissipate with time, she was nervous, she appeared
to lack concern for the victim, and she was smoking heavily
7. No officer detected the odor of alcohol on the defendant, nor did they
observe any obvious signs of impairment, such as poor balance or slurre d
speech.
8. The victim advocate, Cecilia Budd, detected an OUIM >l alcohol on the
defendant while the defendant was seated in a famil) car.
9. The defendant was eventually placed in Detective Roberts un-marked
vehicle and secluded from her family and friends because they were
interfering with the investigation.
10. At the time of the blood draw, the aek , •:• was seated m , elective
Roberts' unmarked vehicle. The defendant was seated hallV a» M the
vehicle, with the door open and her legs outside the vehicle.
11. At the time of the blood draw, the defendant was no t handcuffed or
shackled.
12. At the time of the blood draw, Mr. Davis and Cecilia Budd were
present, and neither was in uniform or armed. Officer Monson was also
nearby, but he was not in uniform.
13. Mr. Davis, the blood technician, spoke to the deicnuuiu about a blood
draw and Mr. Davis could detect an odor of alcohol from the defendant.
14. Mr. Davis reviewed with the defendant her right to remain silent, her
right to counsel, and her right to refuse the test.
15. When asked by Mr. Davis if she would consent to the blood draw, the
defendant voluntarily extended her arm
16. When Mr. Davis drew the defendant's blood, she never tried to
8

withdraw her arm and she never said "no" or "stop."
17. When the blood draw was over, the defendant was immediately calm
and stated that the experience was not as bad as she thought it would be.
(R. 157- 159)(emphasis added).
The trial court's findings are incomplete in failing to acknowledge from the outset
that Officer Saunders, who initially ordered Detective Roberts to obtain Tripp's blood,
routinely took blood samples in cases involving serious accidents and believed that this
was a lawful demand for him to make (R. 533: 10, 25, 55), and that at the time of the
blood draw, Detective Roberts believed that he had the legal right to demand a blood
sample from Tripp as a result of the implied consent statute (R. 532: 23, 533: 33-34).
The police officers' mis-perception that they were not required to obtain
Tripp's consent or a warrant, and the fact that the officers made no effort to obtain a
warrant, are clearly relevant to the assessment of the legality of the blood draw. See State
v. Rodriguez. 2007 UT 15,ffij53-54, 156 P.3d 711 (recognizing relevance of, and
expressing dismay concerning, officer's failure to know that a warrant should be obtained
prior to a blood draw).
Tripp does not contest the factual accuracy of the trial court's sixth factual finding,
that "Detective Roberts based his assessment on the fact that the redness of the
defendant's eyes did not dissipate with time, she was nervous, she appeared to lack
concern for the victim, and she was smoking heavily." He testified that her appearance
when he approached her was "unusual" because her eyes were red, because she was
9

shaking, and because she seemed nervous (R. 533: I 1), He later testified that the more he
talked with Tripp, the more he became concerned that she w as .mpuired because she

dissipating, and because she was constantly smoking (R. 533: 14).
However, the finding is incomplete because it does not account for Detective
Roberts' acknow ledgment that shakiness and nervousness would be normal ;o: someone

that Tripp was very upset by the accident and continued crying up to and throughout the
blood draw (R. 532: 44, 48, R. 533: 67, 77, 82) and that her red eyes were caused by her
crying (R 533: 70 7 7), and the testimon) of the \ i : tit i I'S ad\ c cate that I ripp • as
smoking that night in an effor t to caln l herself (R. 533: 77).
Finding 8 is clearly erroneous in indicating that the victim, advocate detected an •
odor of alcohol on Tripp when Tripp was in a family car, and there is no evidence to
J;.

•*

.

^

'"u

' :i

;

:= I

• ;- >ul did not KIIOW Iiipp smelled oi alcohol

nun Tripp was under arrest and in Detective Roberts' police car, and then did not know if
the smell came from I ripp's clothing or her mouth (R. 525: 221, 224, R. 533: ; 6 ; 8: 86
87;;
Pi nc ii n g 9 i s correct in noting that Tripps' family and friends were interfering with
the police investigation, because police testimony reflects that they were telling Tripp she

I- :

did not have to submit to a blood draw, and were walking through the accident site (R.
533: 73-74). However, the finding is incomplete in failing to recognize that Tripp was
not just moved to the police car, but was told she was in custody, not free to leave and
was arrested at that juncture after she adamantly refused to submit to the blood test (R.
532: 27; R. 533: 16, 31-32, 73). These facts are key to the issue of the lawfulness of her
arrest and the subsequent blood draw, particularly in light of the testimony of Officer that
there was no reasonable suspicion that Tripp was impaired, and the testimony of Officer
Monson that he did not know of a basis for Tripp's arrest (R. 525: 350, 377; R. 533: 73).
Findings 11 and 12 are accurate in indicating that Tripp was not handcuffed or
shackled, that the blood tech and the victim advocate were present, that Officer Monson
was nearby, and that none of these people was in uniform (e.g. R. 533: 67, R. 525: 270).
However, the findings are incomplete in failing to recognize that these people were
physically restraining Tripp during the blood draw. During the blood draw, Officer
Monson was outside the car door and covering Tripp's eyes, while the victim's advocate
was kneeling in front of her holding one of her hands, and the blood tech was right
outside the car door holding her other arm behind her (R. 533: 67, R. 525: 270). She was
pulling away and crying as they secured her (R. 533: 67, R. 525: 271).
Finding 14 is accurate in reflecting that the blood tech reviewed with Tripp her
right to remain silent, her right to counsel, and her right to review the test, because he did
testify that he went over the DUI admonition discussing these rights (R. 533: 102).
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However, the finding is incomplete in failing to recognize that this discussion occurred
after the police informed Tripp that she was in custody, not free to leave, and under arrest

police testimony that prior to the blood tech's discussion of the DUI admonition, the
police demanded that she take the test and told her that she could not refuse to submit to
the blood draw, and that the poli.ce would get a warrant and take her blood by force if she
( !ii iiii il .< x >mplj '(R 53:2 23 2 1 R 533 28.
Finding 15 is clearly erroneous in ^looting that Tripp extended her arm to the
blood tech in response to his asking if she would consent lo the blood draw, and there is
no e»idcni,v. i. ...... .... ,;, support (.. ti.,s nnding. \\ lien a^kco \l Iripp consented to the
i

i ' • '

I

extended 1 lei ai it n to hiii I pi ic i

response to his telling her that he was going to put the tourniquet on and see if there was a
spot where it would be easy to draw blood (R. 533: 94-^5). TK* blood tech felt at that
time tn;

i. , . ..„.,..,;*,.,.. ...... ne nad hi > oihoi equipment iead> lo u*a\\ h^-, i^.^,

the blood, he told her he had found an easy site and told her "we can just go ahead and
take care of this," and as the victim advocate continued reassuring Tripp, he stuck the
I

,

Finding 16 indicates that during the blood dra\s

!

-i— never tried to v rithdrav her

arm and never said "no" or "stop." The finding is supported by the evidence from the
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blood tech that she did not ask him to stop during the draw (R. 533: 95). However, it is
incomplete in failing to account for the State's witnesses' testimony that during the blood
draw, Tripp was terrified, petrified, crying, panicked and pulling away as they secured her
(R. 533: 67, 71, 95). The finding is incomplete in failing to account for the blood tech's
testimony that he could not remember if she said to stop during the blood draw, but that
she was definitely panicked and upset about it (R. 533: 67, 95).

B.

THE TRIAL COURT'S LEGAL CONCLUSIONS WERE
INCORRECT AND MATERIALLY INCOMPLETE.

The trial court made the following three conclusions of law:
1. The defendant's initial refusal was based solely on her fear of needles,
and the evidence demonstrates that at the time of the blood draw the
defendant's fear was resolved.
2. The defendant voluntarily consented to a blood draw.
3. The evidence obtained as a result of the blood draw is admissible.
(R. 157-160).
To the extent that the conclusions encompass factual findings, they are clearly
erroneous, because there is no evidence that Tripp's fear of needles was resolved at the
time of the blood draw, or that she voluntarily consented to the blood draw. Raither, the
evidence demonstrates that during the blood draw, Tripp was terrified, petrified, crying,
panicked and pulling away as the blood tech, victim's advocate and police officer secured
her (R. 533: 67, 71, 95). There is no evidence that Tripp ever gave consent to the draw.
Rather, the evidence demonstrates that the blood draw followed the police officers'
13

telling Tripp that she was in custody, not free to leave, and under arrest (R. 532: 27; R.
533: 16, 31-32, 73), demanding that she take the test, and instructing her that she could
not refuse to submit to the blood draw, and that the police would get a warrant and take
her blood by force if she did not comply (R. 532: 23-27, R. 533: 28, 35, 71-72).
As the following discussion of law demonstrates, a person's submission to
Government threats and physical force does not amount to consent as a matter of law,
particularly when any purported consent follows an illegal arrest.

1.

TRIPP'S ARREST AND THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH
WERE ILLEGAL AND REQUIRE SUPPRESSION OF THE
BLOOD TEST RESULTS.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
"The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protect the 'right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'"
United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 362 (10th Cir. 1989).
Article I § 14 of the Utah Constitution provides protection which is at least coextensive with that of the federal counterpart, in forbidding "sweeping, dragnet-type
detentions of ordinary people engaged in peaceful, ordinary activities. Under both
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constitutions, the general rule is that "specific and articulable facts — taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, [must] reasonably warrant the particular intrusion."
State v. DeBoov, 996 P.2d 546, 549 (Utah 2000). See also id 996 P.2d at 552
(recognizing that Article I § 14 and numerous provisions of the Utah Declaration of
Rights, consistent with the history of the founders of this State, are concerned with "all
purpose criminal investigation without individualized suspicion.").
In order to justify a warrantless arrest, the Government must establish probable
cause. See, e ^ , State v. Hansen. 2002 UT 125,ffif34-36, 63 P.3d 650 (police must have
probable cause to arrest); United States v. Valenzuela, 365 F.3d 892, 901 (10th Cir.
2004)(Government must prove probable cause to justify arrest). Probable cause is
established if the facts known to the officer and the fair inferences from those facts would
lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that the suspect had committed a crime.
State v Cole. 674 P.2d 119, 125 (Utah 1983).
Similarly, in order to justify the warrantless search involved in the blood draw, the
Government must establish, inter alia, a clear indication that evidence would be found in
the blood draw. See, e ^ , State v. Alvarez. 2005 UT App 145, ^ 16, 111 P.3d 808 (to
justify a warrantless blood draw or other Government search, the Government must prove
by at least a preponderance of the evidence '"(A) "a clear indication that evidence would
be found"; (B) "exigent circumstances that justified the warrantless bodily intrusion"; and
(C) "that the method chosen was a reasonable one, performed in a reasonable manner.'")
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(citation omitted).
In the instant matter, the police had no probable cause, but instead arrested Tripp
after she adamantly refused to submit to a blood draw (R. 533: 16, 31-32). They did this
while acting under the incorrect belief that blood draws are routinely taken in serious
accidents (R. 533: 10, 25), and that the police had the legal right to demand a blood
sample from Tripp as a result of the implied consent statute (R. 532: 23, 533: 33-34).
Officer Saunders conceded that he had no reasonable suspicion that Tripp was
impaired or intoxicated, and testified that he sought a blood draw because the accident
was serious, and he routinely seeks blood draws in such cases and believed he could make
the demand (R. 525: 350, 377). Tripp exhibited no signs of intoxication or impairment
(e.g. R. 525: 387). See Trial Court's finding 7 ("No officer detected the odor of alcohol
on the defendant, nor did they observe any obvious signs of impairment, such as poor
balance or slurred speech."). Her red eyes, crying, smoking and nervousness were all
consistent with the facts that she had just been involved in a fatal traffic accident and had
been informed by the police that she had just killed a man and could not refuse their
demand that she submit to a blood draw, which they would force if necessary, despite her
profound fear of needles (e.g. R. 533: 11, 27, 121, 133). Her prolonged crying refutes the
notion that she did not feel bad about the accident ( e ^ R. 532: 14, R. 525: 225, 229).
The fact that she was willing to submit to urinalysis further counsels against accepting the
notion that her refusal to submit to the blood test indicated intoxication (R. 532: 14).
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At the time of the arrest and blood draw, the police did not know if Pracht had
been speeding when he ran into the back of Tripp's truck - Detective Roberts conceded
that Pracht may have been going ninety miles an hour (R. 525: 373, R. 532: 32-35). From
Pracht5 s skid marks, it appeared that he had braked improperly, in a manner known to
cause the sliding which preceded his collision with Tripp's truck (R. 532: 17, 37). It
appeared from the evidence at the scene that had he not done this, there was ample room
for him to steer around Tripp's truck in the intersection or to stop before colliding with
the truck (R. 532: 37, 58-59).
The foregoing facts of this case did not establish probable cause to justify Tripp's
arrest, and failed to establish a clear indication that evidence would be found to justify the
blood draw. Compare State v. Rodriguez. 2007 UT 15,ffi[3, 57, 59, 156 P.3d 711 (police
had probable cause to justify a warrantless blood draw, where driver made an abrupt left
turn in front of an oncoming school bus, accident was likely to be fatal, defendant had
bloodshot eyes and slurred speech, and vodka bottle was found at the scene of the
accident). See also People v. Roybal 655 P.2d 410 (Colo. 1982) (odor of alcohol
emanating from defendant and collision did not give rise to probable cause, absent
evidence that defendant was responsible for collision).
Because there was no probable cause to justify Tripp's arrest, the arrest violated
the Fourth Amendment and Article I §14, and suppression of all evidence flowing from
the arrest is required. See Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 471, 484-488 (1963)

17

(Fourth Amendment violations require suppression). Suppression is also a necessary
consequence of the violation of Article I § 14. See State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465-71
(Utah \990)(plurality)} Because there was no justification for the blood draw, see,
e.g., Alvarez, supra, the blood test results are independently subject to suppression under
Wong Sun and Larocco, supra.

2.

THE WARRANTLESS BLOOD DRAW CANNOT BE
JUSTIFIED ON THE THEORY OF CONSENT.

The blood draw constituted a search under federal and therefore state
constitutional law. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966),
Larocco, supra. Because there was no warrant, the Government bears the burden to
justify the search. See, e,g, State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190, 1993 (Utah App. 1991)
(Government bears burden to justify warrantless search). In order to justify the
warrantless search of Tripp on the theory of consent, the Government must show that the
purported consent was voluntary, and was not the product of the unlawful arrest. E.g.,
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993).

1

While Larocco is a plurality opinion, it is routinely applied as governing law in
this state. See State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 416-20 (Utah 1991) (majority of the
Court recognized privacy interest in bank records under Article I § 14, held in accordance
with Larocco that exclusion is a necessary consequence of a violation of Article I § 14,
and that no exceptions had been recognized to the Utah exclusionary rule); State v.
DeBooy, 996 P.2d 546, 554 (Utah 2000) (finding exclusion of illegal checkpoint stop to
be a necessary consequence of Article I § 14); State v. Ziegelman, 905 P.2d 883, 887
(Utah App. 1995) (finding that violation of Fourth Amendment during traffic stop
required suppression under Larocco).
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Utah law consistently recognizes that where purported consent follows an
illegality, the Government's burden is substantial. Two factors determine whether
consent to a search is lawfully obtained following police action that violates the Fourth
Amendment, such as the unlawful arrest here: (1) the consent must be voluntary in fact;
and (2) the consent must not be obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality.
E.g., Thurman, supra. Both tests must be met in order for evidence obtained in searches
following police illegality to be admissible. Id.
Whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary or was the product of
duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined
from the totality of all the circumstances. While knowledge of the right to
refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the Government need
not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent. In
examining all the surrounding circumstances to determine if in fact the
consent to search was coerced, a court must take into account both the
details of police conduct and the characteristics of the accused, which
include "subtly coercive police questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable
subjective state of the person who consents." It is the State's burden to
prove that a consent to search was voluntary.
State v. Robinson and Towers, 797 P.2d 431, 437 and n.7 (Utah App. 1990).
Factors which may show a lack of duress or coercion include:
1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers; 2) the
absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a mere request to
search; 4) cooperation by the owner of the vehicle; and 5) the absence of
deception or trick on the part of the officer.
State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). If multiple police are present when
consent is given, this can constitute a show of force. See id.
When a person submits or acquiesces to police authority, this demonstrates
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coercion, rather than consent. See Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 497
(1983)(plurality)(lf[W]here the validity of a search rests on consent, the State has the
burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and
voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim
of lawful authority."); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968)("Where there is
coercion there cannot be consent.11); State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103, 106-107 (Utah
1980), supra. Cf. State v. Kelly. 718 P.2d 385, 389 (Utah 1986) (contrasting Bumper and
stating, "Nor was defendant's consent mere acquiescence to perceived police authority.").
The Government did not establish voluntary consent on the facts of Tripp's case.
The police isolated her from her friends and family, informed her she was in custody, and
demanded that she submit to the blood test, telling her that they would get a warrant and
take her blood by force if she did not submit (R. 532: 23-27, R. 533: 28, 35, 71-72).
Dung the blood draw, Tripp was in a police car, with a police officer outside the car door
and covering Tripp's eyes, a victim's advocate kneeling in front of her holding one of her
hands, and the blood tech right outside the car door holding her other arm behind her (R.
533: 67, R. 525: 270). While she did extend her arm to the blood tech prior to the test,
this was in response to his telling her that he was going to put the tourniquet on and see if
there was a spot where it would be easy to draw blood (R. 533: 95). The blood tech felt at
that time that Tripp did not know that he had his other equipment ready to draw her blood
when she extended her arm (R. 533: 95). He testified that once he found a spot to draw
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the blood, he told her he had found an easy site and told her "we can just go ahead and
take care of this," and as the victim advocate continued reassuring Tripp, he stuck the
needle in (R. 533: 95). During the blood draw, Tripp was described as terrified,
petrified, crying, and panicked (R. 533: 67, 71, 95). She was pulling away and crying as
they secured her (R. 533: 67, R. 525: 271).
These facts do not demonstrate a consensual search. Rather, they demonstrate that
the police and their agents forced and tricked Tripp into the blood draw. See, e.g..
Bumper and Whittenback, supra.
The Government bears a particularly heavy burden in seeking to establish consent
following a preceding illegality. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975). In
assessing the Government's proof on this issue, the Court should consider "the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the defendant's consent, focusing on: the temporal
proximity of the illegal detention and the consent, any intervening circumstances, and
particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the officer's unlawful conduct." United States
v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 818 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 1093 (1992). Whether
the officer informed the suspect of her right to refuse consent or to leave are significant
factors in the equation. United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 882 (10th Cir. 1994).
Where only minutes pass between the illegal police activity and the purported consent,
and where there are no intervening circumstances, a finding of voluntary consent is
generally not appropriate. See id. at 883. See also United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d
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558, 562 (10th Cir. 1994)(Government must prove both that consent was voluntary, and
that there was a break in the events between the consent and the preceding illegality;
finding that failure to inform defendant of rights to leave and rights to refuse consent
point to involuntary consent).
Assuming arguendo that the Government could prove that Tripp's consent was
voluntary, the consent was temporally proximate to and part of her illegal arrest and
continuing detention. The only arguably attenuating factor was the blood tech's
reviewing the DUI admonition, and mentioning Tripp's rights to silence, counsel and to
refuse the test (R. 533: 102). This discussion, coming from the blood tech, undoubtedly
rang rather hollow to Tripp, given that the discussion occurred after the police informed
Tripp that she was in custody, not free to leave, and under arrest (R. 532: 27; R. 533: 16,
31-32, 73), and that the discussion followed the police demand that she take the test and
telling her that she could not refuse to submit to the blood draw, and that the police would
get a warrant and take her blood by force if she did not comply (R. 532: 23-27, R. 533:
28, 35, 71-72). Particularly where the blood was drawn when Tripp was physically
surrounded and restrained by the police and their agents, after the blood tech tricked her
into surrendering her arm on the pretense that he would only check to see if there were a
suitable vein (R. 533: 95), his admonition to her did not attenuate the blood draw from the
preceding illegalities, but rather, aggravated them. Tripp was not informed that she was
free to leave, but was instead informed that she was in custody, not free to leave and
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under arrest, and that the police would take her blood by force and get a warrant if she did
not submit (R. 532: 23-27, R. 533: 28, 35, 71-72). The police were not acting in an effort
to comply with the Fourth Amendment, but instead, were flagrantly intent on violating it,
by taking Tripp's blood without first obtaining a warrant or her voluntary consent (R.
525: 10, 25, R. 532: 23, R. 533: 33-34). These facts demonstrate that any purported
consent by Tripp was tainted by and part of the ongoing violations of Tripp's
constitutional privacy rights. See, e^., Brown and Fernandez, supra.
Because the warrantless search cannot be justified under the theory of consent,
suppression is required by Wong Sun and Larocco, supra.

C.

THE ERRONEOUS ADMISSION OF THE BLOOD TESTS WAS
PREJUDICIAL.

It is normally the Government's burden to prove constitutional errors harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967)
(Government bears the burden of proving most constitutional errors harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt). The Government cannot meet this burden here, and assuming
arguendo that she must, Tripp can establish prejudice from the admission of the blood
test results.
The blood test results were prejudicial because they were essential to the
prosecution's conviction of Tripp for automobile homicide, because the automobile
homicide statute required proof of her blood alcohol level or proof that she was under the
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influence of any alcohol or drug to the degree that she could not drive safely. Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-207 (2)(a) (2003). Given that the witnesses attested that Tripp did not appear
to be under the influence (e.g. R. 525: 350, 377), and given that the accident may well
have been caused by Pracht5 s speeding and/or improper braking, rather than by any
unsafe driving by Tripp (T. 526: 475, 509, 515, 514, 516, R. 532: 37-39), there is a
reasonable probability of a different result had the blood test results not been admitted.
Had the jurors not been prejudiced by learning of Tripp's driving while under the
influence of alcohol and with metabolite of cocaine in her system, there is a reasonable
likelihood that they would not have convicted her of failing to yield the right of way,
because the governing statute, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-71.10 (2004), requires drivers to
stop at stop signs and yield to those cars which constitute an immediate hazard. See id.
subsection (b). Given that Tripp was entitled to assume that Pracht was driving the speed
limit, and given that Pracht was apparently speeding and thereby caused the accident (T.
526: 505, 514, 516, 563, 696, R; 527: 705, State's Exhibit 30, R. 533: 60-61; R. 526: 505,
514), there is a reasonable likelihood that the jurors would not have held her responsible
for failing to appreciate the hazard he posed had they not been informed of the blood test
results.
Accordingly, this Court should order a new trial wherein the blood test results are
excluded.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRONEOUS JURY INSTRUCTIONS
REQUIRE A NEW TRIAL.

Both the federal and state constitutions guarantee all criminal defendants5 rights to
present their defenses and have the jury accurately instructed on their theory of the case
and the governing law. In the unanimous opinion, Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683
(1985), Justice O'Connor explained the fundamentals of federal constitutional law
governing the criminal defendant's right to present his defense. She stated,
Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Chambers v. Mississippi, [410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)], or in the
Compulsory Process of confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment,
Washington v. Texas. 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967); Davis v. Alaska. 415 U.S.
308 (1974), the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants "a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense." California v. Trombetta, 467
U.S. at 465; cf Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 684-685 (1984)
('The Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses,
but it defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several
provisions of the Sixth Amendment"). We break no new ground in
observing that an essential component of procedural fairness is an
opportunity to be heard. In re Oliver. 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948); Grannis v.
Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
Id. at 690.
The Constitution of Utah provides parallel protections. An essential of due
process provided by article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution is the "fair opportunity to
submit evidence." Christiansen v. Harris. 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945). "[TJhe
defendant's right to present all competent evidence in his defense is a right guaranteed by
the due process clause of our State Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7[.]" State v. Harding, 635
P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 1981). See also Constitution of Utah, Article I § 12, Utah Code Ann. §
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77-1-6 (providing parallel statutory protection).
To safeguard the foregoing rights, Utah law has long recognized that a defendant
is entitled to have the jury instructed clearly and comprehensibly on her theory of the
case. See, e ^ , State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052, 1058 (Utah 1985).
In the instant matter, Tripp's primary defense was that she was not the proximate
cause of the fatal accident and that she was not negligent, and that Pracht's negligence
was the superseding cause of the accident. This defense was well founded in the law,
which recognizes that in criminal cases, one cannot be held liable for automobile
homicide unless one's negligence caused the death of another. The pertinent 2003
version of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207, which defined automobile homicide at the time of
the April 2004 accident, provided:

(2)(a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third degree
felony, if the person operates a motor vehicle in a negligent manner causing
the death of another and:
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test shows
that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or
greater at the time of the test;
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of
alcohol and any drag to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely
operating a vehicle; or
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at
the time of operation.

(Emphasis added).
As the court demonstrated in State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479 (Utah 1984), the
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defendant's act is not considered the proximate cause of the death if the death is caused
by the act of a third party, which third party action was reasonably unforeseeable by the
defendant. Id. at 482 and n.4. Lawson was convicted of automobile homicide and DUI
with injury and on appeal, he challenged the jury instructions on causation. Id. at 481.
The Utah Supreme Court approved of the trial court's instruction on intervening cause:
If you find that the defendant was negligent but that the proximate
cause of the alleged harm was an independent intervening act of a person
not a party to this case that the defendant, in the exercise of ordinary care,
could not reasonably have anticipated as likely to happen, the defendant's
original negligence is superseded by the intervening act and is not the
proximate cause of the alleged harm. However, if in the exercise of ordinary
care, the defendant should reasonably have anticipated the intervening act it
does not supersede his original negligence or break the chain of proximate
causation.
Id. at 482 n.4. As causation is explained in LaFave, Criminal Law. (Third Edition, 1972),
when criminal results are caused by intervening acts which are coincidental to, rather than
a response to, a defendant's actions, the coincidental acts are normally viewed as
intervening acts which break the chain of causation from the defendant to the result,
unless the coincidental acts are reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. See id. Chapter
3, "Causation," §35, page 258. Similarly, in State v. Larsen. 2000 UT App. 106, 999 P.2d
1252, two of the reasons this Court overturned the negligent homicide conviction was that
the trial court failed to address the proximate cause issue, and the Government had failed
to establish a causal link between the fatal accident and the defendant's lack of
headlights, failure to signal, and use of alcohol. 2000 UT App 106, *§ 20.
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Tripp's lack of causation defense was well founded on the evidence as well,
because the evidence demonstrated that at the time of the collision, Pracht may have been
speeding, and this may have been the cause of the accident. As the trial court recognized,
the State's evidence conflicted regarding whether Pracht should have been driving fifty or
sixty miles an hour (T. 526: 563, 696, R; 527: 705, State's Exhibit 30). Tripp had the
right to assume that Pracht was going the speed limit (R. 533: 60-61). The State's
accident reconstructionist conceded that, due to a lack of underlying data from the police
investigation, he would not purchase stock if his decision were based on information of
the same quality as he had to work with in Tripp's case (R. 526: 516). Nonetheless, he
estimated that Pracht was driving at least 59 miles an hour, and may have been going
faster than that (R. 526: 505, 514). He testified that if Pracht had been going fifty miles
an hour, Tripp would have cleared the intersection before Pracht came through, and that
there would have been no accident (R. 526: 516).
Similarly, Pracht's braking error may have caused the accident. The point of
impact between his motorcycle and the rear end of Tripp's truck appeared to be within
three feet of either side of the center line on U-l 11, the road Pracht was driving on at the
time of the crash (R. 526: 509). The physical evidence showed that prior to the collision,
Pracht was applying only his rear brake (R. 526: 475), and that he skidded for some fortyfour feet prior to sliding underneath and hitting Tripp's truck (R. 525: 355-56, 358, R.
526: 465). Applying only the rear brake on a motorcycle routinely causes them to lose
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control and slide (R. 526: 410, 415). Had Pracht been braking properly, he could have
stopped or steered around Tripp's truck, rather than sliding underneath and colliding with
it as he did (R. 532:37-39).
Pracht's motorcycle headlight was on at the time of the crash (R. 525: 348, 374),
but the road Pracht was driving on is hilly, and dips three eights of a mile prior to the
intersection (R. 533: 59-60). The road configuration or Tripp's own doorpost could have
blocked her view of Pracht's motorcycle as she entered the intersection (R. 533: 60).
Pracht's only fatal injury was to his head (R. 525: 238-49). While his helmet was
found somewhere near the scene of the crash (R. 525: 344), there was no evidence that
Pracht was wearing it at the time of the crash (R. 526: 446-51).
Given the foregoing facts, Tripp's constitutional rights to present her defense
should have required the trial court to give the jurors instructions embodying her defense,
and requiring the Government to overcome her presumption of innocence and meet its
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt with regard to causation.
During an unrecorded bench conference and in-chambers conference, and then
later on the record, counsel for Tripp argued that the trial court's instructions defeated
Tripp's constitutional rights, by failing to permit the jurors to consider Pracht's
negligence in assessing whether Tripp was negligent and was the cause of Pracht's death
(R. 526: 391; R. 527: 683-84). The trial court overruled the objections, because the court
felt that under the court's instructions, the defense could argue that Pracht's acts and

29

omissions were superseding causes (R. 527: 686).
The instructions, however, foreclosed such an argument, in specifically instructing
the jurors that Pracht's negligence, if any, could not be considered to be a superseding
cause, but could only be viewed as a concurrent cause, which would not insulate Tripp
from criminal liability (R. 336). The instructions further informed the jury that Tripp
would not be relieved of criminal liability on the basis of a contributing cause (R. 335,
340). If the jurors followed these instructions, and the law presumes that they did, e.g..
State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 272 (Utah 1988), the jurors did not consider whether
Pracht's actions were the superceding cause of the accident (R. 336, 335, 340). This
violated Tripp's constitutional right to present her defense, and in insulating the
Government's causation case from scrutiny, undercut the Government's burden of proof
and Tripp's presumption of innocence. See, e.g.. Smith, supra (recognizing the
defendant's right to have the jury correctly instructed on the law, including the theory of
the defense).
It is normally the Government's burden to prove constitutional errors harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g.. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967)
(Government bears the burden of proving most constitutional errors harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt). The Government is not in a position to meet this burden in Tripp's
case, because the evidence underlying its essential accident reconstruction analysis was so
incomplete that the State's own expert conceded that he would not rely on this quality of
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evidence in choosing whether or not to buy stock (T. 526: 516). Given the distinct
possibilities that Pracht's speeding and/or improper braking and/or lack of a helmet
caused Pracht's death (T. 526: 475, 509, 515, 514, 516, R. 532: 37-39), the Government
cannot show that the jury instruction errors which foreclosed the jury's consideration of
Pracht's own negligence and the superseding cause were harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Assuming arguendo that Tripp must demonstrate a reasonable probability of a
different result, she is able to do so, given the aforementioned evidence that it was
Pracht's speeding and/or improper braking or lack of a helmet which caused his death (T.
526: 475, 509, 515, 514, 516, R. 532: 37-39).
Because the jury instructions diminished the Government's burden of proof and
under Tripp's presumption of innocence and right to present her defense, and prejudiced
the trial, this Court should order a new trial with proper instructions.

CONCLUSION
This Court should order a new trial wherein the blood test results are excluded and
the jurors are instructed correctly.
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of May, 2007.
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Ajttdmeystbr Appellant

By:
RONALDQ
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ADDENDUM

TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
DENYING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS

DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
KIM CORDOVA, Bar No. 9100
SANDI JOHNSON, Bar No. 9548
Deputy District Attorney
2100 South State, S3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190
Telephone: (801)468-3422

H I E D DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JUL 2 6 2005
aALTLAKE^WITY
* -

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
THE STATE OF UTAH,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

05l<\
-vs-

o33oo

Case No. 94*40195*

SUSAN TRIPP,

Judge John Paul Kennedy

Defendant.

Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence, having come before this Court for
hearing in the above entitled manner on February 25, 2005, and Oral Argument on April
18, 2005, in which Defendant was represented by counsel, Barton J. Warren, and the
State was represented by co-counsel, Kim Cordova and Sandi Johnson. The Court having
reviewed the parties' written briefs and considered oral arguments of counsel, the Court
now enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The defendant was involved in an auto-motorcycle accident, which resulted in
the death of Daniel Pracht.
2. The defendant was asked to submit to a chemical test and stated that officers
could test her blood if they did not use a needle.

3. The defendant's initial refusal to take a blood test was based solely on her fear
of needles.
4. When speaking with Officer Saunders, the defendant denied using alcohol or
drugs and expressed her fear of needles.
5. Detective Roberts talked with the defendant multiple times. The more he
spoke with the victim, the more concerned he became that she was impaired
by something.
6. Detective Roberts based his assessment on the fact that the redness of the
defendant's eyes did not dissipate with time, she was nervous, she appeared to
lack concern for the victim, and she was smoking heavily.
7. No officer detected the odor of alcohol on the defendant, nor did they observe
any obvious signs of impairment, such as poor balance or slurred speech.
8. The victim advocate, Cecelia Budd, detected an odor of alcohol on the
defendant while the defendant was seated in a family car.
9. The defendant was eventually placed in Detective Roberts un-marked vehicle
and secluded from her family and friends because they were interfering with
the investigation.
10. At the time of the blood draw, the defendant was seated in Detective Roberts
unmarked vehicle. The defendant was seated halfway in the vehicle, with the
door open and her legs outside the vehicle.
11. At the time of the blood draw, the defendant was not handcuffed or shackled.
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12. At the time of the blood draw, Mr. Davis and Cecelia Budd were present, and
neither was in uniform or armed. Officer Monson was also nearby, but he was
not in uniform.
13. Mr. Davis, the blood technician, spoke to the defendant about a blood draw
and Mr. Davis could detect an odor of alcohol from the defendant.
14. Mr. Davis reviewed with the defendant her right to remain silent, her right to
counsel, and her right to refuse the test.
15. When asked by Mr. Davis if she would consent to the blood draw, the
defendant voluntarily extended her arm.
16. When Mr. Davis drew the defendant's blood, she never tried to withdraw her
arm and she never said "no" or "stop."
17. When the blood draw was over, the defendant was immediately calm atid
stated that the experience was not as bad as she thought it would be.

3

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The defendant's initial refusal was based solely on her fear of needles, and
the evidence demonstrates that at the time of the blood draw the defendant's
fear was resolved.
2. The defendant voluntarily consented to a blood draw.
3. The evidence obtained as a result of the blood draw is admissible.
DATED this 2k. day of l&fl 2005.
BY THE COURT:

4

TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS

argue those things on the causation issue but I also think
that they go to negligence themselves.
THE COURT:

How do you mean they go to negligence?

MR. YENGICH:

I believe they go - the jury has to

find as you have defined negligence, that she was negligent
in operation of her vehicle and that caused, that caused the
death.

If indeed there were other forces that actually

caused the death, that takes away their requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that she is the negligent factor
that set the events into motion.
THE COURT:

Well, the way the instructions are

written now, as I understand them, they say that if her
negligence, her criminal culpability, does not need to be the
sole cause, that there may be other factors or other causes
involved as long as those other causes do not disrupt the
continuous and natural sequence of events, she would be, if
she were found to be negligent, she would be guilty under the
statute.

What you're suggesting is that these other causes

that you've described that you would argue, the speed, the
helmet, I don't know what other items you have but those
items, if the jury believed that those were sufficient to
constitute intervening causes or superceding causes that
would disrupt the natural sequence of events, then she
shouldn't be, even though she may have been negligent to
begin with, we have these what I would call intervening
685

causes.

I think the jury instructions use the word

superceding causes.

I don't think, the way the jury

instructions are written now, would rule out an argue that
these other charges are superceding causes.
make that argument.

I think you can

The jury will have to determine whether

they're superceding, whether they would interfere with the
natural sequence of events.
MR. YENGICH:
THE COURT:

I understand.
So, does the State have any different

view?
MS. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.
Have I expressed what your position is

on that?
MS. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:

Yes Your Honor.
I think that's the way I've seen the

instructions and that the way it seems to me that they should
be.

If there's an additional instruction that the defense

would want or some other clarifying instruction, I'd like to
see it but I think right now, the way the instructions are
written —
MR. YENGICH:
THE COURT:

Cover that issue.
I think they cover the issue and I

think it enables you to make the argument.
MR. YENGICH:

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, well, if there's anything else,
686
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JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1.

GENERAL INSTRUCTION

There are certain laws and rules which apply to this case. I'll
explain them to you from time to time during these proceedings in order
to give you the information that you need to fulfill your role as jurors at
each stage of the trial. I will give you the first set of instructions at this
point. You will receive further instructions before evidence is presented
and the final set of instructions after the close of evidence. Please pay
careful attention. Each of you has been given a copy of these
instructions. This copy is yours to keep. As I read these instructions to
you, you may follow along on your copy, or not, as you wish. Keep in
mind the following points:
Obey Instructions. Some of these instructions give you
information about how the trial will proceed, the rules that govern
this process, and the roles of the participants, including your role
as jurors. Other instructions tell you what the law is that you are to
apply in reaching your verdict in this case. If any attorney makes
statements of the law that differ from the instructions on the law
that I give to you, you should disregard such statements and rely
entirely on these instructions.
Many Instructions. There will be many instructions. All are
important. Don't pick out one and ignore the rest. Think about each
instruction in the context of all the others.
Gender -Singular/Plural. In these instructions, any references to
"she" or "her" also include "he" or "him," or vice versa, as
appropriate to this case; and the singular, such as "defendant"
includes the plural "defendants," when appropriate.
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Note Taking. The Bailiff has provided you with notepads and
pens. You may take notes during the trial, but don't over do it, and
don't let it distract you from following the evidence. The lawyers
will review the evidence in their closing arguments and help you
focus on what is most relevant to your decision. I also caution that
notes are not evidence. Use them only to aid personal memory or
concentration. Keep in mind that you must each arrive at a verdict
independently, and one juror's memory of the evidence or opinion
should not be given excessive consideration solely because that
juror has taken notes.
Keep an Open Mind. Don't form or express an opinion about the
ultimate issues in this case until you have listened to all the
evidence and the lawyers' summaries, along with the final
instructions on the law. Keep an open mind until your deliberations
are completed.

2.

WHAT RULES APPLY TO RECESSES

From time to time I will call for a recess. It may be for a few
minutes, a lunch break, overnight or longer. During recesses, do not talk
about this case with anyone; not family, friends or even with each other.
The bailiff may ask you to wear a badge identifying yourself as a juror
so that people will not try to discuss the case with you. Don't mingle
with the lawyers, the parties, the witnesses or anyone else connected
with the case. You may say "hello" or exchange similar brief civilities
with these persons, in passing, but don't engage in any conversation.
Don't accept from or give to any of these persons any favors, however
slight, such as rides or food. The lawyers and parties are naturally
concerned to avoid any hint of improper contact with you, so don't think
that they are being purposely rude if they avoid any interaction with you
during the course of this trial. If anyone tries to talk to you about the
case, let the bailiff know immediately. You may communicate with the
bailiff or among yourselves about topics other than a subject of the trial.
Don't read about this case in the newspaper or listen to any reports on
television or radio, if there are any. Finally, don't form or express an
opinion regarding any subject of the trial until you are sent out for
deliberation at the end of the trial. These restraints are necessary for a
fair trial.

3. THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE, THE JURY AND THE
LAWYERS
The judge, the jury and the lawyers are all officers of the Court and
play important roles in the trial.
Judge. It is my role as judge to decide all legal issues, supervise
the trial and instruct the jury on the LAW that it must apply. The
judge may be asked to decide questions of law. Usually these
questions concern objections to testimony that one side wants to
present. By law, it is the judge's job to decide such questions. A
ruling by the judge does not indicate that he is taking sides. The
judge is determining that the law does or does not permit that
particular question to be asked.
Jury. It is your role as the jury to follow that law and decide the
factual issues. Factual issues generally relate to WHO, WHAT,
WHEN, WHERE, HOW or similar things concerning which
evidence will be presented. An alternate juror has the same
responsibilities as any other juror, as he or she may be required to
take the place of one of the jurors in the panel in the event an
original juror is unable to complete her service. Any alternate juror
selected will be identified as such once the case has been presented
and the jury is ready to retire to deliberate on a verdict. As a juror,
you are the fact finder. You must listen carefully to the evidence
presented by each side, and use your life experience and common
sense to make a judgment. It is very important to keep an open
mind while all the evidence is being presented. Making your mind
up before all the evidence is received, could result in a failure to
reach a fair and impartial verdict.
Lawyers. It is the role of the lawyers to present evidence,
generally by calling and questioning witnesses and presenting

exhibits. It is the responsibility of each of the lawyers to be an
advocate, and each has a duty to try to persuade you to accept their
version of the facts and to decide the case in favor of the lawyer's
client.
Keep in mind that neither the lawyers nor I actually decide the
facts of this case, because that is your role. Don't be influenced by what
you think our personal opinions are; rather, you decide il. J v.a^c oased
upon the law explained in these instructions and the r^ >•'"<•*<--* presented
in court.

4.

OUTLINE OF THE TRIAL

The trial will generally proceed as follows:
Opening Statements. The lawyers will outline what the case is all
about, and they will indicate what they think the evidence will
show.
Presentation of Evidence. The plaintiff will offer its evidence
first, followed by the defendant. Each side may also offer rebuttal
evidence after hearing the witnesses and seeing the exhibits offered
by the other side. If an exhibit is given to you to examine, you
should examine it carefully, individually, and without any
comment.
Recesses and Breaks. During the trial there will be periods of
time when the court recesses. During those times you must not
discuss the case with anyone, including fellow jurors; you should
not allow anyone to discuss the case with you. If any attempt is
made to do so, you should report that to the bailiff immediately.
You should not read, hear, or see media coverage of this trial.
Additional instructions on the Law. After each side has presented
its evidence, I will give you additional instructions on the law that
applies to this case.
Closing Arguments. The lawyers will then summarize and argue
the case. They will share with you their respective views of the
evidence, how it relates to the law and how they think you should
decide the case.
Jury Deliberation. The final step is for you to retire to the jury
room and deliberate until you reach a verdict, and you will be

given additional instructions about how you au .»
.. -...
During your deliberations, we will not be able 10 provide • u; • i
transcripts of the trial testimony; you :1^ hrr e 10 relv on - rut
memory. Thus it is important, whether you take notes or not, that
you observe the witnesses carefully and listen carefully to the
testim

5.

THE CHARGES and THE THREE BASIC RULES FOR
CRIMINAL CASES

The defendant in this case has been accused of the crimes of
automobile homicide and failure to yield the right-of-way. The
accusations are in a written document called an INFORMATION, which
will be read or summarized for you following this instruction. As you
listen, keep in mind that the defendant has entered a plea of "not guilty"
and has thereby denied each and all of the essential allegations of the
charges contained in the Information.
There are three basic rules about a criminal case that you must
keep in mind:
First, the defendant is presumed innocent until proved guilty. The
charges against the defendant brought by the State are only accusations,
nothing more. They are not proof of guilt or anything else. The
defendant therefore starts out with a clean slate.
Second, the burden of proof is on the State throughout the case.
The Prosecution bears the burden of proving each and all of the essential
allegations of the charges to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable
doubt. The defendant has no burden to prove her innocence, or to
present any evidence, or to testify. Since the defendant has the right to
remain silent, the law prohibits you from arriving at your verdict by
considering that the defendant may not have testified.
Third, as noted, the State must prove the defendant's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. I will give you further instructions on this point
later, but bear in mind that in this respect a criminal case is different
from a civil case.
The Defendant is charged with the following two crimes:
Count I: On or about April 23, 2004, at 10200 South U111 Highway, in Salt Lake County, in violation of Utah Code

Section 76-5-207( 1), Defendant Susan L. Tripp, was driving a
vehicle while (1) having sufficient alcohol in her body that a
subsequent chemical test showed that she had a blood alcohol
concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test; or (2)
was under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined
influence of alcohol and any drug, to a degree that rendered her
incapable of safely operating a vehicle, or (3) s ,au a bloo,; breath
alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time oi
operation or actual physical control; and caused the death a man
named Daniel Pracht, by operating the vehicle in a negligent
manner.
Coun.
• i or about April 23, J004, al 10200 South U I I I
Highway, in Salt Lake County, in violation of Utah Code Seel ion
41 -6-72.10(2), Defendant Susan Tripp did operate a motor
vehicle approaching a yield sign and failed to slow down to a speed
reasonable for the existing conditions, or, if required for safety, to
stop as provided by law or after slowing or stopping, failed to yield
the right-of-way to a vehicle in the intersection or approaching on
another roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard
during the time the operator was moving across or within the
intersection or junction nf midways.
The Defendant has denied wrong-doing and has entered a plea
of "Not Guilty" to both of these alleged offenses.
Defendants' plea of "Not Guilty" puts in issue every material
element constituting the above alleged offenses. The plea of "Not
Guilty" places upon the Prosecution the burden of proving every element
or essential allegation contained in the charges beyond a reasonable
doubt.

6.

WHAT IS THE JURY'S ROLE IN THIS CASE?

You must decide whether each charge against the defendant has
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Your decision is called a
VERDICT. Your verdict must be based only on the evidence produced
here in court. It must be based on facts, not on speculation. Don't guess
about any fact. However, you may draw reasonable inferences or arrive
at reasonable conclusions from the evidence presented. You should
perform your duty to be a jury uninfluenced by pity for the defendant or
by passion or prejudice against the defendant. You must not allow
yourselves to be biased against the defendant because of the fact that the
defendant has been arrested for this offense, or because an Information
has been filed, or because the defendant has been brought before the
court to stand trial. None of these facts is evidence of guilt, and you are
not permitted to infer or to speculate from any or all of them that the
defendant is more likely to be guilty than innocent.
You are to be governed in your deliberations solely by the
evidence introduced in this trial and the law as stated to you by me. The
law forbids you to be governed by mere sentiment, conjecture,
sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling. Both the
State of Utah and the defendant have a right to demand and they do
demand and expect that you will conscientiously and dispassionately
consider and weigh the evidence and apply the law of the case, that you
will reach a just verdict regardless of what the consequences of such
verdict may be. The verdict must represent the individual opinion of
each juror.

7.

WHAT IS EVIDENCE?

Evidence is anything that tends to prove or disprove the existence
of a disputed fact. Evidence includes testimony, documents, objects,
photographs, recordings, stipulations, certain qualified opinions, and/or
any combination of these things. Sometimes the lawyers may agree that
certain facts exist; this is called a stipulation. You should accept any
stipulated facts as having been proved In limited instances, I may take
"judicial notice" • ••! > well-known \';w I If that happen
v i 11 ex n lain
;; 'should "

8.

OPINION TESTIMONY

Under certain circumstances, witnesses are allowed to express an
opinion. A person who by education, study or experience has become an
expert in any art, science or profession, may give an opinion and the
reason for it. A layperson (a non-expert) may also be allowed to express
an opinion if it is based on personal observations and it is helpful to
understanding such person's testimony or other aspects of the case.
You are not bound to believe anyone's opinion. Consider it as you would
any other evidence, and give it the weight you think it deserves.

9. WHAT IS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED OR USED AS
EVIDENCE?
I've explained to \ 01.1 w hat evidence is. Now I'll tell you about
some things which do not qualify as evidence ui which. :<•! . * . oliiu
good reaso- • • ••• should not consider in reaching voin- *• *' "'<<
' ••• '
Accusation. The fact that formal charges have i-.u .• ; ilea accusing
the defendant of committing a crime is not evideiu . <>f puilt. The
defendant has entered a plea of not guilty and is presumed u
'nc
innocent. As I will discuss in more detail later in these
instructions, it is the prosecution's burden to prove to you that the
defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; the defendant does
not have the burden to prove that the defendant is innocent.
runisnmeni. i uu may be aware of the gravity of the offense
charged and the range of potential penalties, uu-. a snouiu <> t
consider what actual punishment the defendant may receive if
found guilty. That is for the judge to decide based upon th
applicable lav .
Right to Remain Silent. If the defendant chooses not to testil
this case, you cannot consider that as evidence of guilt. T^e
Constitution provides that an accused person has the right not to
testify and you should not draw any negative inferences based
upon a defendant's reliance on this right. If the defendant does
choose to testify, defendant's testimony should be given the same
consideration you would give to the testimony of any other
witness. The fact that a person is accused of a crime is no evidence
of that person's guilt and is no reason for rejecting such person's
testimony; it should be weighed the same way you weigh the
testimony of any other witness.

Lawyer Statements. What the lawyers say is not evidence. Their
purpose is to give you a preview of expected evidence and to help
you understand the evidence from their viewpoint. If a lawyer
makes a statement about the evidence which is different from your
own recollection of the evidence, you should rely on your own
memory.
Objections to questions. Objections to questions are not evidence.
Lawyers have an obligation to their clients to make objections
when they believe evidence being offered is improper under the
rules of evidence. You should not be influenced by the objection,
or by the court's ruling on it.
Persona! Investigation. Evidence is not what you can find out on
your own. You should not make any investigation about the facts
in this case. Do not make personal inspections, observations or
experiments. Do not view premises unless this is done as a group
with the permission of the court, things or articles not produced in
court. Don't let anyone else do anything like this for you. Don't
look for information in law books, dictionaries or public or private
records which are not produced in court.
Out of Court Information. Do not consider anything you may
have heard or read about this case in the media or by word of
mouth or other out-of-court communication. You must rely solely
on the evidence that is produced and received in court.

10.

HE JUDGE DECIDES WHAT EVIDEiV
ADMISSIBLE

Sometimes a question will be raised about whether certain
evidence is proper for the jury to consider. This type of question is
called an OBJECTION. I rule on objections. If an objection is
SUSTAINED the evident •: i^ kept out and you should not consider it,
nor should yi-i: jiic-^s .r> i< • what the evidence might have been or what
was the reason ioi the ubjemuji Tf an objection is OVERRULED the
evidence comes in and you mx consider it. ! f evidence which you have
heard or seen is STRICKEN -\ must ign<» >•
My decisions regarding the admissio
evidence involve issues
of law, and I am not giving any opinion as to which witnesses are or are
not worthy of belief or as to which party should prevail in the case.
Don't be concerned about the reasons for my rulings, and don't try to
infer anything about the case from those rulings.
Further, if I do or say anything during the course of this trial that
suggests to you that I favor the position of either party, whether in my
rulings or otherwise, it is entirely unintentional; and you must not be
influenced by that in any way.

11. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE TO CONVINCE THE JURY?
The prosecution has the burden of proof. It is the one making the
accusations in this case. The defendant is not required to prove
innocence - you must start by assuming innocence. According to our
law, the defendant is presumed to be innocent unless proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Before you can give up your presumption
that the defendant is innocent, you must be convinced that the
defendant's guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

12.

WHAT IS REASONABLE DOUb

"Reasonable doubt" means a doubt tn.it is based on -eason --r1
common seiwe h is a di-nhi uhich is reasonable in view of all the
e\ idence. h niu.si be a reasonable doubt and not w*. oubi which is merely
fanciful or imaginar • *• '-acou J.; . wnoll> speculative possibilm
reasonable ,. n!"
« •;<; .; t which reasonable men and women would
entertain, an;* :" form the evidence or tLe lack of the evidence
in this case.
. ;».j ; :• abonable doui-i i. in . • ; i. ••! prooi » >• - ,
satisfies the mind, com ince^ the understanding * h»»se who '
to act conscientious!) up*-.
d obviates, v)i* einninates, all reasons K
doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an
absolute certainly.

13.

HOW TO MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT THE EVIDENCE

It will be your duty to determine your verdict relying solely on the
evidence presented during the trial. For that purpose you should
consider all of the evidence together, fairly, impartially and
conscientiously, putting aside any bias, prejudice, or preconceptions.
Once evidence is admitted, you must decide three things about it:
Whether it should be believed, how important it is, and what you can
reasonably infer or conclude from it. An inference is a conclusion that
logic, reason, or common sense leads you to draw from a fact or group of
facts that the evidence has established.
Use your common sense as a reasonable person in making these
decisions. Review all the evidence. Don't imagine things which have no
evidence to back them up. Consider the evidence fairly without any bias
or sympathy toward either side.
Where there is conflicting evidence, you should try to reconcile the
conflict so far as you reasonably can. Where the conflict cannot be
reconciled, you are the final judges and must determine from the
evidence what the facts are.
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14. DECIDING WHETHER TO BELIEVE A WITNESS
You are the sole judges of the importance of Ihe evidence, the
believabilitx , !"the w ilnesses and the fau
e ss no fun !ule that I
can give yoi. tor determining whethei a witness is truthi,. As each
witness testifies, >vu n^r-t decide how accurate that testimony is and
what v\et_u. •» inve a. u•.*!-.>. -. <\u •wu good judgment and experience in
li!-: In eva'.;.•!!••:. tiv<t i^wur. ' r- !->l?«« r t to a^i* yourself questions

Persona, mieres;

JCS the

i -..

how the trial comes • -n*?
Other Bias. Does the witness have some other bias or motive to
testify a certain way?
Demeanor What impression is made by the witness's appearance
and conduct while answering questions?
LonsiMctiL> Did the witness make conflicting statements 01
contradict other evidence?
Knowledge and Memory. Did the witness have a good opportunity
to know the facts and the ability to remember them?
Reasonameness. I1 ihr lrsliinoi)\ ir.tsonaM' HI ' ' <>! human
experience?
You may also apply any other common sense yardstick to me
testimony you hear and the other evidence \ ou receive A/~" r
^
required to believe any witness or all that a «.\ itness say^
entitled to believe one witness as against man) or man> a^ „ 0
,
in accordance with your honest convictions.

The mere fact that a witness is a police officer, in itself, does not
make that person's testimony more or less credible, but such testimony
must be weighed in the same way as you would any other witness.

15.

WHAT IK A WITNESS PURPONKLY < JlVUS I Al Si:
TESTIMONY?

If you believe a witness has purposely given false testimony about
anything relevant to the case, you may disregard not only the false
testimony but any of the remaining testimony from that witness, or you
may give the remaining testimony whatever weight you think it
deserves.

Instruction No. 16: The Charges
As noted above, the Defendant, Susan L. Tripp, is charged with the
following crimes:
Count I: On or about April 23, 2004, at 10200 South U-l 11
Highway, in Salt Lake County, in violation of Utah Code Section
76-5-207(1), Defendant Susan L. Tripp, was driving a vehicle while
(1) having sufficient alcohol in her body that a subsequent chemical
test showed that she had a blood alcohol concentration of .08 grams
or greater at the time of the test; or (2) while under the influence of
alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and any
drug to the degree which rendered the defendant incapable of safely
operating a motor vehicle; or (3) had a blood or breath alcohol
concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of operation or
actual physical control; and caused the death of a man named Daniel
Pracht, by operating the vehicle in a negligent manner.
And
Count II: On or about April 23, 2004, at 10200 South U-l 11
Highway, in Salt Lake County, in violation of Utah Code Section
41-6-72.10(2), Defendant Susan L. Tripp did operate a motor
vehicle and having stopped as provided by law, failed to yield the
right-of-way to a vehicle in the intersection or approaching on
another roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard
during the time the operator was moving across or within the
intersection or junction of roadways.
The Defendant has denied wrong-doing and has entered a plea
of "Not Guilty" to both of these alleged offenses. Defendant's plea
of "Not Guilty" puts in issue every material element constituting each of
the above alleged offenses. The plea of "Not Guilty" places upon the
State the burden of proving every element or essential allegation
contained in the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

^.r »ii nui • tak j Hie following ming.s w nh you when you go into the
jury room t<_ discuss this case:
a.

All exhibits admitted in evidence;

b.

Your notes (if any);

c.

Yum itipy ol thesr msinu'lions; nnd

d.

I IK" \ L'idk'1 11ri• 111 H I I M I I ili,ii w ill I',j ' i v c n | • < •,,

18. WHAT TO DO IN THE JURY ROOM
The first thing you should do in the jury room is choose a person to
be in charge. This person is called the FOREPERSON. The
Foreperson's duties are:
a.

To keep order and allow everyone a chance to speak;

b.

To represent the jury in any communications you make; and

c.

To sign your verdict and bring it back to court.

In deciding what the verdict should be, all jurors are equal. The
Foreperson has no more power than any other juror.

'ft

YOUR VERDICT MUST Bli
ARRIVED AT AFTER OPEN AND H(
DELIBERATION.

DECISION
T

• nnsider each other's » pini- ns. liu n : ach \ -mr o^ :i decision
hasei
• •).'onest deiiheranis rareh productive or good for a
!..i i ..pri! ciiienMj. tiiv. |-.„,
. •.« make an emphatic expression of
opminn or tii announce a determination i--•• UK! 1 «i a certain \eidu'
When that o done at the outset, a poison's sens*, of pride ma> hi-u k
Mpionriatcv »nMderai>--no* l!i • . •< I'so <»m , mm»»- m e n v - • iur
common ur.d.Tsiandint. and \ . . n •!. mon • -ns
' ' • or,e
with each omer as \ ou pondei and deliberate.
!l

ie end. } our verdict must be you- - o \ Don't make a decision
just to agree with everyone else, i'ou should, however, respect and
consider the opinions olthe other jurors If vou are persuaded that a
decision v<;. .miially made was wrong, don i liesitate to change your
• . u >. .!« ' -Mhei arri\e M the truth x .mi decision must he
uiicuniii- c.
i , attempt »<• *<ch a decision. \o-i ma;. • •. >i ,• -vn-; H
C-hawv or

'

•** - . ' ' l i T i v - '• 4 ::m ••'". • t l ; r

honr ' dr'-h^nt

20. WHAT TO DO IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS DURING
DELIBERATION
If you think you need more information or a clarification, write a
note and give it to the bailiff. I will review it with the lawyers. We will
answer your question whenever appropriate. However, these
instructions should contain all the information you need to reach a
verdict based upon the evidence that has been presented to you. You
should understand that no further evidence can be provided to you.

.

I <)( 'US ON "I'lllS < 'ASK ALONK,

at Uut\ IN !«• UCCIUL uit> case and this case alone. You should
not use this case as a (>-.rum for correcting perceived wrongs in other
cases or in the broader societ), <>i as a means of expressing views about
am thing other than the guilt or innocence of this defendant. Your
Let should reflect the law given to you i these instructions applied
ne facts that you find to be supported b\ the evidence. Your decision
Miuiild not be distorted by any outride factors or objectives.

;turn. You will make an important contrib aion to justice and your
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22.

REACHING A VERDICT

Each count should be considered separately. You may find the
defendant guilty of both counts alleged in the criminal Information, or
you may find her not guilty of all counts alleged in the criminal
Information, or you may find her guilty of one, but not all of the counts
alleged in the criminal Information. The fact that a defendant may be
guilty of one count is no evidence that she is guilty of any other count.
The matter of the appropriate punishment, if any, is a matter solely
reserved to the Court. Your duty as jurors is only to judge the facts and
apply the law as given to you by me in these instructions to determine
the guilt or innocence of the defendant of the offense(s) charged in the
criminal Information. You should not consider in any way the possible
penalty involved in reaching your verdict.
In determining any fact in this case you should not consider nor be
influenced by any statement made or act done by the Court which you
may interpret as indicating its views thereon. You are the sole and final
judges of all questions of fact submitted to you, and you must determine
such questions for yourselves from the evidence, without regard to what
you believe the Court thinks thereon. The Court has not intended to
express, or intimate, or be understood as giving any opinion on what the
proof shows or does not show, or what are or what are not the facts in
the case. Indeed, it is immaterial what the Court thinks about it. You
must follow your own views and not be influenced by the views of the
Court.
As I have said, this being a criminal case, your verdict must be
unanimous; all jurors must agree. When you are all in agreement, then
you have reached a verdict and your work is finished.

23.

HOW TO REPOK

RDICT
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24. WHAT HAPPENS AFTER THE VERDICT HAS BEEN
REPORTED
After you have given your verdict to the judge, the prosecution and
the defense will be asked to stand, and he will direct the clerk to read the
jury's verdict. After that, the judge or the clerk may ask each of you
about the verdict to make sure you agree with it. Then you will be
released from your jury service and you may leave at any time.
After you are excused, you may talk about the case with anyone.
Likewise, you are not required to talk about it, if you don't want to. If
anyone attempts to talk to you about the case when you don't want to do
that, please tell the Bailiff or the Court Clerk. Finally, if you do decide
to discuss the case with anyone, keep in mind that your fellow jurors
freely stated their opinions in the jury room with the understanding that
they were speaking in confidence. Please respect the privacy of the
views of your fellow jurors.

I lie 11 IN I ructions are to be considered as a whole.
These instructions, though numbered separately, are to be
considered and construed by you as one connected whole: Each
instruction .ii 'ukl be read and understood in reference to and as a part of
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26. The Verdict Form.
Concerning Count I, your verdict in this case must be either:
1.

Guilty of automobile homicide
(or)
Not Guilty of automobile homicide

And, Concerning Count II, your verdict in this case must be either:
2.

Guilty of failure to yield the right-of-way
(or)

Not Guilty of failure to yield the right-of-way,
as your deliberations may determine.
This being a criminal case, a unanimous concurrence of all jurors is
required to find a verdict. Your verdict must be in writing, and when
found, must be signed and dated by your foreperson and then returned
by you to this court. A form for the verdict will provided for the Jury.
The Foreperson should sign and date this form, filling in any appropriate
blanks. When your verdict has been found and the form completed,
notify the bailiff that you are ready to report to the court.

INSTRUCTION NO. 27: Elements of Automobile Homicide
Before you can convict the defendant, Susan Tripp, of the offense of
Automobile Homicide, as charged in Count I of the information, you must
find from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every
one of the following elements of that offense:
1. That on or about the 23rd day of April, 2004, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the defendant, Susan Tripp,
2. While operating a motor vehicle in a negligent manner,
3. Caused the death of Daniel Pracht; and
4. (a) had sufficient alcohol in her body that a subsequent
chemical test showed that she had a blood or breath alcohol
concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test; or
(b)

was under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the
combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree
that rendered her incapable of safely operating a vehicle;
or
(c) had a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams
or greater at the time of operation.
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you
are convinced of the truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty of
Automobile Homicide. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond
a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you
must find the defendant not guilty.

28. "Negligent Manner" and "Cause" Defined
"Negligent manner" means that the Defendant Susan L. Tripp
failed to exercise that degree of care that reasonable and prudent
persons exercise under like or similar circumstances.
We all have a duty to use reasonable care to avoid injuring
others. Reasonable care is simply what a reasonably careful person
would do in a similar situation.
A person may be negligent in acting or in failing to act. The
amount of care that is reasonable depends upon the situation. Ordinary
circumstances do not require extraordinary caution. But some
situations require more care because a reasonably careful person would
understand that more danger is involved.
In this context, you are also instructed that "cause" has a special
meaning, and you must use this meaning whenever you apply the
word. "Cause" means that:
(1) the Defendant Susan L. Tripp's act or failure to act produced
the death of Mr. Pracht directly, or set in motion events that
produced his death in a natural and continuous sequence;
and
(2) the Defendant Susan L. Tripp's act or failure to act could be
foreseen by a reasonable person to produce a harm of the same
general nature.
In addition, you are also instructed that there may be more than
one cause of the same harm.

INSTRUCTION NO. 29: Sole Proximate Cause Not Necessary
The State is not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant's negligence was the sole proximate cause of death. When a
defendant negligently creates a risk of death to another person, the fact that
the person actually died as a result of the combination of that negligence
plus some other contributing factor does not relieve the defendant of
criminal culpability.

INSTRUCTION NO. 30: Victim's Negligence
A victim's negligence, if it exists, can be considered to be a
concurrent cause and not a superseding one. Therefore, even if a victim
were negligent, such a fact would not insulate the defendant from criminal
culpability.

INSTRUCTION NO. 31:

Driver's Duty of Care

The law imposes upon the driver of any vehicle using a public
highway the duty to exercise ordinary and reasonable care to avoid causing
an accident from which injury might result. This duty requires a driver to
be vigilant at all times, keeping a lookout for traffic, traffic signals and
other conditions reasonably to be anticipated; and to keep the vehicle
under such control that the driver can stop as quickly as might be required
of the driver in situations that would be anticipated by an ordinary, prudent
driver in like position in order to avoid a collision.

INSTRUCTION NO. 32: Seeing Objects
General human experience supports the inference that when one in
possession of his or her faculties looks in the direction of an object clearly
visible, he or she sees it. When there is evidence to the effect that one did
look but did not see that which was in plain sight, in the exercise of
ordinary care, it follows that either there is an irreconcilable conflict in such
evidence, or the person was negligently inattentive.
The driver of a motor vehicle is charged with the duty of seeing those
objects or persons which he or she would have seen had he been exercising
reasonable care.

INSTRUCTION NO. 33: Creating a Dangerous Condition
Where a party by his or her wrongful conduct creates a condition of
danger or peril, his or her action can properly be found to be a proximate
cause of a resulting injury, even though later events which combined to
cause the injury may also be classified as negligent, so long as the later act
is something which can reasonablly be expected to follow in the natural
sequence of events.

INSTRUCTION NO. 34: Indirectly Causing Death
It is not required that the defendant's actions be the direct cause of the
victim's death. It is sufficient that they cause death indirectly through a
chain of natural effects and causes unchanged by human action. The fact
that other causes contribute to the death does not relieve the actor of
responsibility, provided such other causes are not the sole proximate cause
of the death.

INSTRUCTION NO. 35: Inflicting Injury and Causing Death
One who inflicts an injury on another is deemed by the law to have
caused the death of another if the injury contributes immediately or
mediately to the death of such other.

INSTRUCTION NO. 36: Definition of "Motor Vehicle"
"Motor vehicle" means any self-propelled vehicle and includes any
automobile, truck, van, motorcycle, train, engine, watercraft or aircraft.

INSTRUCTION NO. 37: Definition of "Driving"

"Driving" is the every-day definition as you may understand it. It
means "to urge forward under guidance, compel to go in a particular
direction or direct the course of."

INSTRUCTION NO. 38: Blood Alcohol Tests
When an officer requests the defendant to submit to a chemical test
to determine the person's blood or breath alcohol level, the defendant does
not have the right to select a test different from the one requested by the
officer, and it is not a defense in a criminal proceeding that a peace officer
failed to arrange for a specific test requested by the defendant.

INSTRUCTION NO. 39: Accuracy of Chemical Test
In admitting evidence of a chemical analysis of the defendant's blood,
the Court does not determine the accuracy of the test or analysis. Such is
a question of fact for the jury alone to determine.

INSTRUCTION NO. 40: Definition of "Under the Influence"
"Under the influence of alcohol," as that expression is used here,
covers not only the condition of various degrees of intoxication, but also
covers any mental or physical condition which renders a person incapable
of safely driving a motor vehicle as a result of ingesting alcohol.
The State is not required to prove that the defendant was drunk or
intoxicated, as those terms are commonly understood. The State is only
required to prove that while driving or in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle in Salt Lake County, the defendant had a blood alcohol level of .08
grams or greater as shown by a chemical test taken after the alleged
operation or physical control of a vehicle.

INSTRUCTION NO.

41: Yielding the Right-of-Way

Except when directed to proceed by a peace officer, every operator of
a motor vehicle approaching a stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop
line and shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle in the intersection or
approaching on another roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate
hazard during the time when the operator is moving across or within the
intersection or junction of roadways.

INSTRUCTION NO.
Way

42:

Elements of Failure to Yield Right-of-

Before you can convict the defendant, Susan Tripp, of the offense of
Failure to Yield the Right of Way, as charged in Count II of the
information, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a
reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of that
offense:
1. That on or about the 23rd day of April, 2004, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah;
2. The defendant, Susan Tripp, as a party to the offense, was the
operator of a motor vehicle approaching a stop sign; and
3. That the defendant, after stopping at the stop sign, failed to
yield the right-of-way to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on
another roadway.
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you
are convinced of the truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty of
Failure to Yield Right of Way. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements,
then you must find the defendant not guilty.

INSTRUCTION NO. 43: View of the Scene
You have had the opportunity to view a portion of Highway U- 111,
including the intersection where the collision occurred.
You must keep in mind that your view of these areas occurred more
than two years after the collision and that there may have been changes
along the Highway or at the intersection. You should disregard any
changes that may have occurred.

CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND RULES

Constitution of Utah, Article I § 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law.

Constitution of Utah, Article I § 12
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists
unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any
preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by
statute or rule.
Constitution of Utah, Article I §14

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

United States Constitution, Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-71.10 (2004)
(1) Preferential right-of-way may be indicated by stop signs or yield signs under Section
41-6-99.
(2)(a) Except when directed to proceed by a peace officer, every operator of a vehicle
approaching a stop sign shall stop:
(i) at a clearly marked stop line, but if none,
(ii) before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection, but if none, then
there is not a clearly marked stop line; or
(iii) at a point nearest the intersecting roadway where the operator has a view of
approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering it if there is not a clearly
marked stop line or a crosswalk.
(b) After having stopped at a stop sign, the operator of a vehicle shall yield the right-ofway to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on another roadway so closely as to
constitute an immediate hazard during the time when the operator is moving across or
within the intersection or junction of roadways.
(c) The operator of a vehicle approaching a stop sign shall yield the right-of-way to
pedestrians within an adjacent crosswalk.
(3)(a) The operator of a vehicle approaching a yield sign shall:
(i) slow down to a speed reasonable for the existing conditions; and
(ii) if required for safety, shall stop as provided under Subsection (2).
(b)(i) After slowing or stopping at a yield sign, the operator of a vehicle shall yield the
right-of-way to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on another roadway so
closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time the operator is moving across
or within the intersection or junction of roadways.
(ii) The operator of a vehicle approaching a yield sign shall yield to pedestrians within an
adjacent crosswalk.
(4)(a) A collision is prima facie evidence of an operator's failure to yield the right-of-way
after passing a yield sign without stopping if the operator is involved in a collision:
(i) with a vehicle in the intersection or junction of roadways; or
(ii) with a pedestrian at an adjacent crosswalk after passing a yield sign without stopping,
the collision is prima facie evidence of the operator's failure to yield the right of way but
(b) A collision under Subsection (4)(a) is not considered negligence per se in determining
liability for the accident.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(2003)
(1) As used in this section, "motor vehicle" means any self-propelled vehicle and includes

any automobile, truck, van, motorcycle, train, engine, watercraft, or aircraft.
(2)(a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third degree felony, if the person
operates a motor vehicle in a negligent manner causing the death of another and:
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test shows that the person
has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test;
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any
drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of operation.
(b) A conviction for a violation of this Subsection (2) is a second degree felony if it is
subsequent to a conviction as defined in Subsection 41-6- 44(1 )fa).
(c) As used in this Subsection (2), "negligent" means simple negligence, the failure to
exercise that degree of care that reasonable and prudent persons exercise under like or similar
circumstances.
(3)(a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a second degree felony, if the person
operates a motor vehicle in a criminally negligent manner causing the death of another and:
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test shows that the person
has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test;
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any
drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of operation,
(b) As used in this Subsection (3), "criminally negligent" means criminal negligence as
defined by Subsection 76-2-103(4).
(4) The standards for chemical breath analysis as provided by Section 41-6- 44.3 and the
provisions for the admissibility of chemical test results as provided by Section 41-6-44.5
apply to determination and proof of blood alcohol content under this section.
(5) Calculations of blood or breath alcohol concentration under this section shall be made in
accordance with Subsection 41-6-44(2).
(6) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been legally entitled
to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense.
(7) Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol content or drug content is admissible
except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution.

Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel;
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him;
(c) To testify in his own behalf;

(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him;
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf;
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district where the offense is
alleged to have been committed;
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial within
30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail and if the business of the court permits.
(2) In addition:
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense;
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees
to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of
those rights when received;
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself;
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a husband against his
wife; and
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no
contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by jury has been waived or, in case of an
infraction, upon a judgment by a magistrate.

